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Abstract
Motivated by the great success and adoption of Bitcoin, a number of cryptocurrencies such as
Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Ethereum are becoming increasingly popular. Although existing blockchain-
based cryptocurrency schemes can ensure reasonable security for transactions, they do not consider
any notion of fairness. Fair exchange allows two players to exchange digital “items”, such as digital
signatures, over insecure networks fairly, so that either each player gets the other’s item, or neither
player does. Given that blockchain participants typically do not trust each other, enabling fairness in
existing cryptocurrencies is an essential but insufficiently explored problem.
In this paper, we explore the solution space for enabling the fair exchange of a cryptocurrency
payment for a receipt. We identify the timeliness of an exchange as an important property especially
when one of the parties involved in the exchange is resource-constrained. We introduce the notion
of strong timeliness for a fair exchange protocol and propose two fair payment-for-receipt protocol
instantiations that leverage functionality of the blockchain to achieve strong timeliness. We implement
both and compare their security and efficiency.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal success of Bitcoin [1] has fueled innovation in a number of application
domains such as financial payments, smart contracts, and identity management. Recently, a
number of blockchain-based solutions have also been proposed in the Internet of Things (IoT)
domain. Device-to-device transactions in IoT infrastructures may well make use of cryptocur-
rency payments in exchange for information or other items of value, without requiring human
participation. In scenarios involving resource-constrained devices, it is important to minimize
the computation, communication and energy costs of participating in blockchain systems. For
example, many blockchain platforms offer the so-called simplified payment verification (SPV)
to interface with such devices.
The massive adoption of Bitcoin has truly fueled innovation, and there are currently more
than 500 alternate cryptocurencies—most of which are simple variants of Bitcoin. Some of
these extensions cannot be deployed without changing the code base of Bitcoin (i.e., via a hard
fork). These are referred to as altcoins and require some measures to initiate currency allocation
and preserve mining power by leveraging the already established Bitcoin community.
One of the (many) reasons that led to the growing adoption of blockchain-based cryptocur-
rencies is their premise of low-cost global payments without the need for a bank account,
or a cumbersome registration process. However, although existing cryptocurrency schemes can
reasonably ensure the security of payments, they do not provide any notion of fairness. Given that
blockchain participants do not necessarily trust each other, we argue that fairness is an especially
important property that should be preserved to ensure the growth of existing cryptocurrency
exchanges [2].
For instance, consider the example where a payer Alice makes a payment to a payee Bob
in return for an expected good (digital or physical) or a service. This process is unfair towards
Alice if her expectation is not met after Bob receives the payment. On the other hand, it is
unfair towards Bob if he does provide the service but Alice later cancels or double-spends the
payment. Namely, a fair payment scheme should ensure that Bob receives the payment if and
only if Alice’s expectations are met and vice versa. We can model this as a fair exchange of
payment-for-receipt where the receipt is a digital signature, which can act as a proxy for a
physical/digital good or real-world service.
While there is a wealth of literature on fair exchange in a general setting [3], [4], little
attention has been paid to the problem of fair exchange involving cryptocurrencies [2]. In this
paper, we explore the solution space to achieve fair payment-for-receipt for cryptocurrencies.
More specifically, we analyze how well known fair exchange techniques can be adapted for use
with existing cryptocurrencies, in particular by leveraging functionality from the blockchain. We
propose two such protocols and analyze/compare their provisions.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We introduce the notion of strong timeliness for a fair exchange protocol (cf. Section III).
We argue that completing the exchanges in a timely and fair manner is an important
consideration for fair exchange, especially for resource-constrained devices.
• We propose two fair payment-for-receipt protocols for cryptocurrency payments (cf. Sec-
tions V-B and VI) that leverage functionality from the blockchain to meet both fairness and
strong timeliness. Additionally, we compare these protocols to the proposal by Heilman
et al. [5].
• Finally, we implement and evaluate the performance and costs of our constructions (cf.
Section VII).
II. BLOCKCHAIN AND SMART CONTRACTS
The notion of blockchain was originally introduced by the well-known hash-based proof-of-
work (PoW) mechanism that confirms cryptocurrency payments in Bitcoin [1]. Bitcoin payments
are performed by issuing transactions that transfer Bitcoin coins from the payer to the payee.
These entities are called “peers”, and are referenced in each transaction by means of pseudonyms,
denoted by Bitcoin addresses. Each address maps to a unique public/private key pair; these keys
are used to transfer the ownership of coins among addresses. Miners are entities that participate
in the generation of Bitcoin blocks. These blocks are generated by solving a hash-based PoW
scheme; more specifically, miners must find a nonce value that, when hashed with additional
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fields (e.g., the Merkle hash of all valid transactions, the hash of the previous block), the result
is below a given target value. If such a nonce is found, miners then include it in a new block
thus allowing any entity to verify the PoW. Since each block links to the previously generated
block, the Bitcoin blockchain grows upon the generation of a new block in the network.
As such, the PoW-based blockchain ensures that all transactions and their order of execution
are available to all blockchain nodes, and can be verified by these entities. Consensus by the
majority of participating miners is required for every transaction exchanged in the system. This
inherently prevents double-spending attacks (where the payer attempts to spend the same coin
twice), and ensures the correctness of all transactions confirmed in the blockchain as long as
the majority of the network is honest.
To ensure that a payment in a cryptocurrency transaction is definitive, a payee needs to
wait until a sufficient number of new blocks have been appended to the block that contains
the particular transaction so as to minimize the probability that the block is not part of the
eventual consensus. In Bitcoin, this may take up to an hour. In some situations (e.g., low-value
transaction), a payee may be willing to accept a transaction as soon as it is broadcast to the
network. These are referred to as zero confirmation transactions, which are fast but carry a risk
of payment reversal.
Bitcoin’s blockchain fueled innovation, and there are currently more than 500 alternate cryp-
tocurrencies, most of which are simple variants of Bitcoin. Additionally, a number of novel
applications have already been devised by exploiting the secure and distributed provisions
of the underlying blockchain. Prominent applications include secure timestamping [6], timed
commitment schemes [7], secure multiparty computations [8], and smart contracts [9].
Smart contracts refer to binding contracts between two or more parties that are enforced in
a decentralized manner by the blockchain nodes without the need for a centralized enforcer.
Smart contracts typically consist of self-contained code that is executed by all blockchain nodes.
For example, Ethereum [9] is a decentralized platform that enables the execution of arbitrary
applications (or contracts) on its blockchain. Owing to its support for a Turing-complete language,
Ethereum offers an easy means for developers to deploy their distributed applications in the form
of smart contracts. Ethereum additionally offers its own cryptocurrency Ether which is also used
as the main fuel to execute the contracts and send transactions. Ether payments are commonly
used to cover the costs related to contract execution; these costs are measured by the amount of
gas they consume.
III. FAIR EXCHANGE
A two-party exchange usually involves two players who exchange items between themselves.
Each player holds an item that it wants to contribute to the exchange and an expectation about the
other player’s item it wants to receive in exchange. Fair exchange is executed between players
that do not trust each other; examples include commercial scenarios such as payment-for-receipt,
online purchase, digital contract signing, and certified mail. A fair exchange protocol must ensure
that a malicious player cannot gain any advantage over an honest player. More specifically, it
should satisfy the following requirements [4]:
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• Effectiveness: If both players behave correctly, exchange will eventually happen.
• Fairness: There are two possible notions of fairness:
◦ Strong Fairness: At the time of protocol termination, either both players get what
they want, or neither of them does.
◦ Weak Fairness: In situations where strong fairness cannot be achieved, an honest
player can prove to an (external) arbiter that the other player has received (or can
still receive) the item the latter expects.
• Timeliness: Honest players can be certain that the protocol will be completed at a certain
finite point in time. At completion of the protocol, the state of the exchange is final from
that player’s perspective.
• Non-invasiveness: The protocol should allow the exchange of arbitrary items without
making any demands on its structure, i.e., the fair exchange protocol does not itself impose
any requirement on the form of the items being exchanged. For example, a fair exchange
scheme to exchange signatures in any standard digital signature algorithm, such RSA or
ECDSA, is considered non-invasive. However, if a scheme requires anyone who wants to
verify the exchanged signatures to access and perform some check on the blockchain, then
that scheme is invasive.
• Transaction duration: The time taken for the exchange should be short.
The timeliness requirement defines a fixed point in time at which the protocol will be com-
pleted. This property aims to avoid the case where one player in the exchange has to wait
indefinitely for the other player to take an action that will determine how the exchange will
be concluded (successfully or otherwise). Timeliness is particularly important for resource-
constrained IoT devices which cannot afford to be online for long stretches of time or poll
indefinitely. One way to achieve the timeliness requirement as stated in [4] is to agree on a
pre-defined timeout. This is typically a challenging task, since it is difficult to predefine an
optimal time point at which the protocol should be completed: a short timeout will result in the
exchange failing even when both player are honest (thus harming the effectiveness requirement),
whereas a long timeout is unacceptable for resource-constrained devices with limited battery or
bandwidth. Ideally, the notion of timeliness should capture the possibility that either player can
decide to conclude the exchange at any point during the exchange without having to depend on
the actions of the other player. To remedy this, we therefore define a new notion of timeliness,
dubbed strong timeliness, as follows:
• Strong timeliness: An honest player can, any point in time, choose to complete the
protocol. At completion, the state of the exchange is final from that player’s perspective.
In this paper, we consider the “payment-for-receipt”, where an entity, Alice, makes a digital
payment to another entity, Bob, in order to get a receipt for the payment in the form of a
digital signature. Our goal is to explore the solution space for integrating a fair exchange of
payment-for-receipt into existing cryptocurrency payment schemes. (Hereafter referred to as “fair
payments” for the sake of brevity.)
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IV. FAIR PAYMENTS WITH FIXED TIMEOUTS
Recently, a number of fair blockchain-based protocols have been proposed [5], [7], [8], [10].
All of them rely on the use of fixed timeouts to ensure fairness. In this section, we discuss
why the use of fixed timeouts can negatively impact fairness guarantees, and possibly even the
overall security of the protocol. As an example, we use a protocol by Heilman et al. [5] that uses
timeout-based fair payments using an intermediary to improve the anonymity of cryptocurrency
payments. Here, a user Alice wants to fairly exchange a cryptocurrency payment for a voucher
from an intermediary Bob. The voucher is in fact a blind signature; Alice will unblind the
voucher and send it privately to an anonymous payee who can exchange it with Bob in such a
way that Bob cannot link Alice and the payee [5].
This is achieved without relying on any external entity through the use of blockchain-based
script and using a fixed, predefined, timeout to implement a timely fair exchange. First, Alice
generates a transaction that enables her to pay a pre-defined amount to Bob under the condition
that Bob must publish a valid signature on a message within a certain time window; The output
of this transaction will become an input in one of the following two blockchain transactions:
1) A transaction which is signed by Bob and contains a valid signature on the requested
message (i.e., exchange is successful and fair).
2) A transaction which is signed by Alice and the time window has expired. (i.e., exchange
fails and the money reverts to Alice).
The condition is fulfilled if Bob posts a transaction that contains a valid signature and the
promised payment is transferred from Alice to Bob. If Bob does not publish a signature within the
time window, Alice can sign and post a transaction that returns the promised payment amount
back to herself. All transactions are broadcast to the blockchain network, thus allowing all
blockchain miners to verify whether the payment conditions have been met, and reach consensus
on the state of the exchange.
This protocol ensures a fair exchange between Alice and Bob, i.e., prevents Alice from double-
spending her payment, and enables Bob to spend Alice’s payment only if Bob has published his
signature. We now analyze this protocol in relation to the requirements from Section III:
• Effectiveness: If the timeout is too short, there may be not enough time for Bob’s
transaction to be confirmed in the blockchain. Namely, the miners will refuse to confirm
that transaction after the timeout has passed. In this case, the effectiveness of the fair
exchange cannot be guaranteed since the exchange fails because of the timeout even when
both parties behave correctly.
• Fairness: The protocol does not ensure strong fairness since it is possible that the timeout
is reached after Bob broadcasts his transaction, but before it is confirmed in the blockchain.
For example, the adversary may mount a denial-of-service attack against Bob to throttle
its network connectivity [11]. In this case, Alice might receive the signature without Bob
receiving the payment. However, the protocol satisfies weak fairness, since Bob can prove
to an (external) arbiter that his signature on Alice’s requested message has indeed been
revealed to the public. Note that this renders the anonymous payment scheme of [5]
insecure!
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• Timeliness: This protocol satisfies weak timeliness but not strong timeliness, since once
the Bob’s transaction is confirmed, Alice cannot decide to complete the exchange any
sooner than the specific timeout.
• Non-invasiveness: The protocol is non-invasive because it does not impose any specific
structure on Bob’s signature.
• Transaction duration: Bob needs to wait for a period such that enough blocks has been
appended to the blockchain after its own transaction appears there. Alice has to wait at
most till the timeout.
V. OPTIMISTIC FAIR PAYMENTS
A. Optimistic Fair Exchange
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) protocols were first proposed by Asokan et al. [3], [4]; their
protocol relies on the presence of a trusted third party (TTP) but only in an optimistic fashion:
TTP is only required when one player attempts to cheat or simply crashes. In the common case
where Alice and Bob are honest and behave correctly, TTP need not to be involved.
Optimistic fair exchange consists of an exchange protocol (protocol exchange) and two re-
covery protocols (protocol abort and protocol resolve). First, both players agree on what needs
to be exchanged and which third party to use in case of an exception. Such an “agreement” is
informal: it has no validity outside the context of the protocol. Then, one player (e.g., Alice)
sends a verifiable encryption (cA) of her item (iA) and her expectation about Bob’s item (eA).
The verifiable encryption enables any entity to verify the validity of iA (without the need for
decrypting the message); and can be decrypted only by the trusted third party TTP. Bob first
verifies iA, constructs an encryption cB of (iB, eB), and decides similarly whether to send it to
Alice.
If Bob does not send cB , Alice can abort the protocol at any point in time by initiating protocol
abort with TTP which issues an abort token. In this case, the exchange is unsuccessful but fair:
neither player receives any additional information about each other’s item. If Bob sends cB , and
Alice has not decided to abort, she verifies the validity of iB and decides whether to send iA
to Bob. While waiting for iA, Bob can initiate protocol resolve at any time by sending (cA, iB)
to TTP. TTP will decrypt cA to get (iA, eA) and return iA to Bob if iB meets eA and it has not
previously issued an abort token for this particular exchange. If a transaction was previously
aborted, TTP will not agree to resolve it. Similarly it will not agree to abort a transaction that had
already been resolved. Alice can run resolve in the same way while waiting for iB from Bob. This
is a general fair exchange protocol that can support “items” in the form signatures in standard
signature schemes. It requires TTP to keep state for every aborted or resolved transaction.
B. Blockchain-based OFE with a Stateless TTP
We now extend the above OFE protocol by making use of a blockchain to avoid the need
for TTP to maintain state. Alice can abort the exchange by publishing an abort transaction to
the blockchain instead of sending an abort message to TTP. Thus TTP only needs to support
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function abort(exchange id idex)
if entry of idex exists then
if sender is the originator and the retrieved entry is a resolved item iB then
return iB to the sender
end if
else
add an entry of idex with an abort token
end if
end function
function resolve(exchange id idex, optional resolved item iB)
if sender is TTP then
if entry of idex exists and the retrieved entry is an abort token then
return aborted
else
add an entry of idex with the optional resolved item iB
return ¬ aborted
end if
end if
end function
Fig. 1: Smart contract for blockchain-based OFE to assist abort and resolve procedures in order
to keep TTP stateless.
the resolve protocol. It does not need to keep any state w.r.t. the protocol execution since all
needed state information is recorded in the blockchain. We implemented this variant of OFE
using Ethereum’s smart contracts as shown in Figure 1. Note that when TTP recovers item iA
in response to a resolve request from Bob, it needs to save Bob’s item iB so that any subsequent
abort from Alice can be answered correctly by the smart contract without violating Alice’s
fairness. Therefore, TTP will ask the smart contract to save iB during Bob’s invocation of
resolve.
We can easily build a fair payment protocol based on this blockchain-based OFE, by having
iA be a signature corresponding to a payment message in a cryptocurrency scheme. First, we
consider zero confirmation payments: the two players exchange payment for a receipt but do not
wait for the payment to be confirmed in the blockchain. We now analyze this protocol w.r.t. the
properties listed in Section III:
• Effectiveness: Effectiveness is guaranteed if both players behave correctly, since Alice
will get Bob’s signature immediately after the OFE and her payment will be eventually
confirmed.
• Fairness: Once the OFE completes, Alice receives iB and Bob receives iA. However,
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Alice can double-spend the money associated with iA after the completion of OFE, thus
invalidating strong fairness. Bob can however prove this misbehavior to an arbiter by
showing iA. So, this scheme only satisfies the weak fairness property.
• Timeliness: Strong timeliness is inherited from classical OFE: either player can invoke
protocol resolve at any point if they have received the other player’s verifiable encryption
(cA or cB). Alice can attempt to abort at any time. In all cases, the protocol is guaranteed
to terminate fairly.
• Non-invasiveness: The signature iB is non-invasive since it can be any signature in any
form.
• Transaction duration: Since the transactions are zero confirmation, they can complete
fast during optimistic execution (no need to wait any blocks confirmed on the blockchain).
This variant can be upgraded from zero confirmation to full confirmation by borrowing the
approach of Mayes et al [2] to require that Bob and TTP check if iA is confirmed on the
blockchain as follows. After getting iA from Alice, Bob broadcasts it and waits for it to be
confirmed on the blockchain before sending iB to Alice. When Bob asks TTP to resolve, TTP
similarly broadcasts iA and waits for it to be confirmed on the blockchain before storing iB .
When it resolves for Alice, it returns iB only after iA is confirmed on the blockchain. If iA was
double spent before being confirmed, TTP will treat it as though Alice aborted the protocol.
This full confirmation variant achieves strong fairness but at the expense of longer transaction
duration.
VI. FAIR PAYMENTS OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SIGNATURES
We now describe a variant that dispenses with the need for TTP altogether but at the expense
of making the signature invasive. Our proposal unfolds as follows. Alice first constructs the
message to be signed, and uses it to create a transaction with an output of some amount of
digital money that is spendable in one of the following two transactions:
1) A transaction that is signed by Bob and contains a valid signature on the requested
message;
2) An abort transaction that is signed by Alice.
Notice that there are no time window/constraints in Alice’s transaction, and it can trigger
either of the above two transactions, depending on which one is confirmed in the blockchain
first. Recall that if both are broadcast, only one of them will eventually be confirmed (since
they conflict with one another). This protocol is invasive since Bob’s signature is only valid if
it is stored on the blockchain, a.k.a. blockchain-based signature. Namely, a verifier must not
only check that the signature is (cryptographically) valid, but also that it is confirmed in the
blockchain.
This protocol can be fully deployed as an Ethereum smart contract without the need for TTP.
In this case, Alice will first send a deposit to the contract; the contract will forward the deposit
either to Bob or back to Alice, depending on whether it receives Bob’s signature or Alice’s abort
first (respectively). An example of such contract functions is sketched in Figure 2.
Our extension ensures the following properties:
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function initExchange(payment Tpay[v], expected item m and recipient)
if state is UNINITIALIZED and contract has received the payment with value v then
record originator, recipient and m
switch state to INITIALIZED
end if
end function
function abort
if state is INITIALIZED and the message is sent by the originator then
refund v to the originator
clear up storage and switch state to UNINITIALIZED
end if
end function
function resolve(signature on m)
if state is INITIALIZED and the message is sent by the recipient then
if signature on m is valid then
send v to recipient and the signature to originator
clear up storage and switch state to UNINITIALIZED
end if
end if
end function
Fig. 2: Smart contract for fair payment of blockchain-based signature.
• Effectiveness: If both players behave correctly, Bob will receive the payment by publishing
a signature, and Alice will obtain her desired receipt when the signature has been confirmed
on the blockchain.
• Fairness: Bob can only receive the payment when his signature is confirmed on the
blockchain. Similarly, once it is confirmed, Alice has a valid receipt. Ether the signature
or the abort will be confirmed, but not both.
• Timeliness: The protocol terminates after either the signature or the abort is confirmed.
Alice can choose to wait for the signature to be confirmed or issue an abort. In the former
case, the exchange is successfully completed. In the latter case, Alice cannot gain any
advantage since the signature is valid only if it is confirmed in the blockchain. Similarly
Bob can either issue a signature and wait for it to be confirmed, or simply walk away. In
either case, the state of the exchange is final.
• Non-invasiveness: Clearly, the signature is invasive since it is only valid when it is
confirmed in the blockchain.
• Transaction duration: The transaction duration is long because both parties need to wait
for either Bob’s signature or Alice’s abort to be confirmed on the blockchain.
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VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now describe and evaluate our Ethereum-based implementation of the contracts depicted in
Figure 1 (fair payment with blockchain-based OFE) and Figure 2 (fair payment with blockchain-
based signature).
A. Implementation Setup
We assigned an Ethereum node to each entity (e.g., Alice, Bob, TTP). These nodes are
connected to a private Ethereum network (that is equipped with private mining functionality)
with a bandwidth limit of 100Mbps. We deployed the mining node and TTP on two servers
both with 24-core Intel Xeon E5-2640 and 32GB of RAM. In our testbed, Alice and Bob
reside on two machines equipped with 4-core Intel i5-6500 with 8GB of RAM and 8-core Intel
Xeon E3-1230 with 16GB of RAM, respectively. In our implementation, these entities prepare
and send the transactions to the blockchain using the Javascript library web3.js. This library
interfaces the Ethereum nodes through its RPC calls. In the blockchain-based OFE instantiation,
we implement OFE computation and communication using GoLang and C. We use the ECDSA
signature scheme, which is directly supported by Ethereum contracts. We use the verifiable
encryption scheme in [4] implemented with cryptographic library GMP [12] in C. We preset
and fix the difficulty of our private Ethereum testnet in the code and the genesis block so that
the block generation time is around 5 seconds.
In our experiments, we measured the gas and time consumption for the following procedures:
deploy, optimistic completion, abort, and TTP resolve. Deploy refers to deploying the smart
contract into the blockchain. In blockchain-based OFE, the smart contract is deployed by TTP
to manage its state. Optimistic completion refers to the successful completion of the exchange
without invoking resolve or abort. Finally, the contract is triggered by Alice for abort and by
TTP for resolve. We only consider the resolve protocol under the assumption that the exchange
has not been aborted.
To measure gas consumption, we observe the difference in the account balance before and
after invoking the contract, and we convert this amount to the amount of gas according to our
fixed gas price. We measure the eclipsed time starting from the initial contract invocation until
the entities receive the notifications from the Ethereum network. In our evaluation, each time
measurement is averaged over 10 independent executions of the fair exchange protocol; where
appropriate, we also report the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
B. Evaluation Results
1) Gas consumption: Our evaluation results are shown in Table I. We first observe that for
both contracts, contract deployment consumes the most amount of gas since the process of
creating contracts and storing data in the blockchain are expensive operations in Ethereum [13].
As described earlier, the blockchain-based OFE variant does not need to involve the blockchain at
all during optimistic exchanges. Therefore the gas consumption for an optimistically concluded
fair payment is zero. We contrast this with the blockchain-based Signature variant (Section VI),
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Actions
Protocols with blockchain-based OFE with blockchain-based signature
(Section V-B) (Section VI)
deploy 537,783 645,900
optimistic completion
Alice 0 126,457Bob 27,935
abort 67,574 33,746
TTP resolve 132,600 –
TABLE I: Gas consumption in Ethereum contracts to perform each action of blockchain-based
fair payment protocols.
which requires 126,457 gas from Alice in order to initiate the exchange protocol and 27,935 gas
from Bob to complete it. The large overhead incurred on Alice here is mainly caused by storing
exchange contract parameters in the blockchain during contract initialization. Notice that abort
requires considerably more gas in blockchain-based OFE when compared to the blockchain-
based Signature (Section VI). This is due to the fact that the contract may spend more gas in
order to transmit the previous resolved item (if any). Similarly, TTP resolve potentially needs to
store resolved items in the contract (cf. Section V-B) – which incurs additional gas consumption.
2) Time consumption: Table II shows the measured eclipsed time. We observe that the contract
invocation process is rather time-consuming; for instance, the protocol initialization procedure
by Alice in blockchain-based Signature (Section VI) consumes around 4 seconds. We contrast
this with 277 milliseconds which is required for the completion of the blockchain-based OFE
protocol. The latter is almost 14 times faster in spite of the reliance on verifiable encryption,
due to the fact that the blockchain needs to generate a block in order to include the transactions.
Recall that the average block generation time in our private Ethereum network is tuned to be
around 5 seconds.
The time execution of the remaining operations is comparable in both protocols, which is
around 4 seconds. This value largely depends on block generation time of the blockchain network.
Notice that the width of the confidence interval corresponds to the variation of block generation
times exhibited in Ethereum.
3) Summary: Given our findings, we conclude that the fair payment protocol based on blockchain-
based OFE is more cost- and time-effective than its counterpart based on blockchain-based
Signatures (Section VI) when the protocol is executed without exceptions.
In the case where an exception occurs, both protocols incur comparable costs and time
overhead. Namely, since any transaction can only take effect once they are confirmed in the
blockchain (i.e., every 12 seconds in the Ethereum public blockchain), the reliance on the
blockchain in abort and resolve protocol incurs considerable time delays.
VIII. COMPARISON AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we explored the solution space to realize fair exchange within cryptocurrencies.
To this end, we proposed two fair payment-for-receipt protocols for cryptocurrency payments
(cf. Sections V-B and VI) that leverage functionality from the blockchain to meet both fairness
and strong timeliness. A systematic comparison between our proposals is shown in Table III.
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Actions
Protocols with blockchain-based OFE with blockchain-based signature
(Section V-B) (Section VI)
optimistic completion
Alice
277.0± 9.2 3, 831.0± 973.2Bob 4, 195.8± 1, 077.3
abort 3, 432.4 ± 1, 000.3 4, 301.5± 1, 305.6
TTP resolve 3, 773 ± 902.5 –
TABLE II: Eclipsed time in milliseconds with 95% confidence interval to perform each action
of blockchain-based fair payment protocols.
Requirements
Types with fixed timeout
(Section IV)
with blockchain-based OFE
(Section V-B) with blockchain-based signature(Section VI)
zero-confirm full-confirm
Fairness weak weak strong strong
Timeliness weak strong strong sting
Effectiveness ?
√ √ √
Non-invasiveness
√ √ √
X
No TTP
√
X X
√
Duration of transaction long short long long
TABLE III: Comparisons of different blockchain-based fair payment protocols.
Our findings suggest that the first scheme cannot satisfy the strong timeliness property, and
as such can only guarantee weak fairness. Furthermore, choosing a short-timeout here can
harm the effectiveness of this construct. In this respect, the constructs based on blockchain-
based OFE (Section V-B) and blockchain-based signature (Section VI) establish the strongest
tradeoffs between performance and provisions. Namely, our performance evaluation shows that
the blockchain-based OFE option is more efficient when the exchange concludes optimistically.
As such, it seems to be ideal in those scenarios where only weak fairness is sufficient or when
non-invasiveness is required. Otherwise, we recommend the reliance on the blockchain-based
signature option.
Privacy has not been considered as a requirement for fair exchange protocols. However, there
are a number of scenarios where privacy considerations play a paramount role. For example,
the message to be signed may contain some important information about Alice that cannot be
revealed. In all of the three constructions, the contents of the signature can be seen by the public;
there are, however, a number of techniques that can be used to protect the contents of signatures.
For instance, one can improve the blockchain-based OFE (Section V-B) protocol by having TTP
send a verifiable encryption of iB to the resolve contract—thus preserving the privacy of Alice.
In conclusion, while there are no “bullet-proof” solutions that simultaneously achieve all
desirable properties discussed above we observe that a number of trade-offs exist within the
solution space to sacrifice one property in order to achieve the rest. Depending on the applica-
tion scope, this might already offer a differentiator and stronger value proposition for existing
cryptocurrencies. We therefore hope that our findings motivate further research in this largely
unexplored area.
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